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THE SAFETY BARRIER DILEMMA 
"Ran-off-the-road" fatal accidents currently 
account for approximately 65 percent of all freeway 
fatalities (1). Accordingly, ever-increasing emphasis has 
been given to the developmel)t of effective safety barrier 
systems, from guardrails to earth berms to median 
barriers to energy absorbing barriers and mires. However, 
highway designers have also recognized that safety 
barriers are hazards in themselves, misfits in the highway 
environment, and that they are items to be eliminated 
wherever possible. In a study of fatal accidents on the 
Interstate Highway System, it was found that fixed 
object collisions have been the leading source of 
fatalities, accounting for 43 percent of the 1968-1969 
fatal accidents (2). Ironically, guardrails were found to 
be the most frequent objects struck first -- accounting 
for 31 percent of the totaL Furthermore, this same 
study estimates that, excluding non-interstate and 
secondary urban roads, 6,300 miles of guardrail were 
constructed on public roads in 1969. Statistics such as 
these illustrate the risks facing today's drivers on the 
Interstate Highway System. Until a major modification 
is made that produces a siguificant reduction in such 
risks, less mobility (through travel restrictions) will be 
required to produce a significant reduction in fatalities 
per year (3). 
Safety barriers are a direct result of the adoption 
of minimal design standards for our freeway systems. 
Most highway designers realize that more liberal, 
optimum designs would actually cost little more over 
the life of a facility and would increase its useful life 
span. Nevertheless, minimum design standards are 
frequently the accepted criteria for the design of 
highways. The reason given, ironically, is economy. A 
mininum of expense is highly desirable; but the road 
which is truly the cheapest is not the one which has 
cost the least money, but the one which makes the most 
profitable returns in proportion to the amount which 
has been expended upon it (cf 4). 
The purpose of any safety barrier is to reduce the 
number of highway fatalities and to minimize personal 
injuries. Also to be remembered is the order of emphasis 
for service requirements: first to safety, second to 
economics, and third to aesthetics ( 5 ). The highway 
designer is faced with a choice between equally 
unsatisfactory alternatives. He is faced with the safety 
barrier dilemma. On one hand, he may select the more 
economical, in the short term, minimal design which 
always warrants the installation of myriads of safety 
barriers; these items are conceded by most to be traffic 
hazards in themselves. On the other hand, he may 
choose optimum design standards with their higher 
short~ term cost but lower, overalllongBterm cost arising 
from the decrease in the number of accidents and 
corresponding reductions in accident and maintenance 
cpsts. In particular then, the highway designer may 
.!protect" steep 2:1 sideslopes with guardrail; or he may 
choose sldeslopes so flat (6: I, for example) that in most 
instances they do not need to be "protected" ·by 
guardrail. He may "protect" fixed objects with guardrail; 
or he may provide a 30-foot clear zone in which all 
objects are of frangible design. He may "protect" 
median bridge_ piers with guardrails or earth berms; or 
he may choose to eliminate median bridge piers entirely. 
He may choose a narrow median requiring a median 
barrier or simply choose a wide, 60- to 90-foot median. 
Finally, he must decide between installation of 
energy-absorbing barriers at hazardous gores or the 
elimination of hazardous gores by contour grading. 
A longitudinal barrier, such as guardrail and median 
barriers, affords only a relative degree of protection to 
vehicle occupants; a collision with this type of barrier 
can result in a severe and possible compound accident. 
Therefore, longitudinal barriers are warranted only at 
locations where the severity of a collision with the 
roadside feature or an opposing vehicle or of traversing 
an embankment would be greater than a collision with 
the safety barrier (5). Figure I illustrates a steep 
sideslope "protected" with guardrail; and Figure 2 
illustrates a fiatter sideslope without guardrail 
11 prot.ection1 1• 
Embankment guardrail need has, in the past, been 
determined on the basis of Figure 3 (6). However, the 
results obtained from this figure are subject to 
modification by considerations of cost, alignment, grade, 
traffic volume, climate, and accident experience. The 
curve is also subject to future change to reflect: I) 
improved guardrail performance, 2) improved accident 
cost computing methods, 3) variation in weights and 
dimensions of future automobiles, and 4) improvements 
to vehicle crashworthiness and "safety packaging" of 
occupants ( 5 }. Giving due consideration to each of these 
variables, the designer fmds himself in a dilemma. The 
choice between guardrail and flatter embankments is not 
so cut-and-dried when these other variables are 
considered. 
Other warranting features for guardrails are the 
existence of fixed objects and non-traversable roadside 
hazards. Nearly one-third of all highway fatalities occur 
when vehicles leave the roadway and strike a roadside 
obstacle (5 ). A study at the General Motors Proving 
Ground (7) indicates that 80 percent of the vehicles 
leaving the pavement did not travel more than 29 feet 
from the edge of the pavement, as shown in Figure 4. 
It is important to note that the roadside at the General 
Motors Proving Ground has embankments with 10:1 
slopes. The effectiveness of the magical 30-foot clear 
zone where slopes are greater than 10:1 is suspect. Thus, 
the designer who plans guardrail to "protect" 2:1 and 
3: I slopes and who provides 30-foot clear zones (Figure 
5) on these slopes is, insofar as safety is concerned, 
inadequate at his job. By providing flatter side slopes, 
although at greater initial construction cost, the designer 
can in most cases eliminate the need for guardrail and 
can provide a 30-foot (minimum) clear zone more 
realistically capable of enabling errant drivers to return 
their vehicles safely to the pavement. Intuitively, the 
issue is not as simple as has been stated. The initial cost 
of providing 5: 1 and flatter slopes at all but the highest 
(60 foot and over) fill locations is often seen as 
prohibitive. However, when the perhaps more theoretical 
long-term cost, with its lower maintenance and accident 
cost components, is considered, this option proves to 
be a judicious choice. This is but another example of 
the safety barrier dilemma facing highway designers 
today. 
The AASHO Traffic Safety Committee ( 1) has 
recommended that where overpasses over divided 
highways are being designed, two-span structures with 
supports in the center of wide medians are generally 
the optimum design. The merits of a single span 
structure are even more obvious. Furthermore, the 
"Yellow Book" states that the median piers necessitated 
by the former design should, where close to the 
roadway, be protected for the safety of the motorists, 
The highway designer must choose the best safety 
barrier for this critical task. The two barriers used most 
commonly to "protect" median piers are guardrail and 
earth berms. Neither alternative is completely 
satisfactory, but a choice between the two must be 
made. Double'beam guardrail with flared terminal 
sections (Figure 6), although expensive, is currently 
considered by most to be the optimum guardrail design 
(1 ). A second alternative, though not as well 
documented, is the use of earth berms (Figure 7) to 
divert wayward vehicles from median bridge piers. 
Furthermore, earth berms may be considered more 
economical since most of the work involved in 
constructing the mound can be done during 
grade-and-drain construction using materials available on 
location. In Ohio and West Virginia, the mound in the 
median is virtually continuous for most sections where 
it is employed. Maryland has mounds in the median 
which extend 500 feet in both directions from bridge 
piers. Illinois has experimented with earth berms on 
either side of the approach near the pier but not around 
the pier itself. A preliminary study of earth berms 
conducted by the Kentucky Department of Highways 
(8) concluded that, for low-speed encroachments, the 
following improvements in mound design are justified 
I) In order to mmumze ramping effects, the 
mound should extend 500 feet in both 
directions from the bridge piers. 
2) The mound nose should be warped off-center 
to present a greater rightward deflecting 
surface and to lessen the tendency for vehicles 
to become airborne and (or) mount the ridge 
and descend on the wrong side. 
3) The mound should transition from 3: I to 2: I 
on the side slopes and also have an increasing 
slope in the top of the mound as shown in 
Figure 8. 
4) The application of a wood-chip mulch to the 
mound, thought by the investigators to 
enhance the energy-absorbing characteristics 
of the installation, should be deleted. The 
energy-absorbing characteristics of plantings, 
such as shrubs and flowering quince, were not 
evaluated. 
Further complicating the choice, as previously 
mentioned, is the use of single-span structures with 
30-foot clear shoulder zones ·- structures which 
eliminate median bridge piers entirely, and which result 
in increased bridge construction costs, ~s well as 
decreased accident costs. 
Historically, median barriers (Figure 9) have been 
used to prevent across-the-median, head-on collisions 
between automobiles in opposing traffic sireams. 
Warrants for these barriers have been based on median 
width and traffic volume as in Figure 10 (5). Except 
on the basis of adverse accident experience, median 
barriers have generally not been warranted if median 
width exceeds 50 feet (Figure 11). However, headlight 
glare research by Webster and Yeatman (9) concluded 
that speeds would need to be limited to 40 mph with 
the 6-foot lateral separations and 50 mph for the 33-, 
72-, and 94-foot lateral separations in order to assure 
adequate stopping sight distance to high-reflectance 
targets under low beam conditions. The secondary 
function of rigid median barriers as glare screens is 
undeniable. Such findings tend to undermine the 
confidence of those highway designers who have come 
to consider the wider median types as the optimum 
design. The dilemma once again is apparent. With due 
consideration to right-of-way costs, barrier costs, 
maintenance costs, and accident costs, which is the 
better design: the wide (greater than 50 feet), 
obstacle-free medians or the narrower (less than 50 feet) 
medians with longitudinal barriers, which physically 
separate opposing traffic streams and provide improved 
nighttime visibility as well as reduced motorist 
distraction during the daytime? 
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A final example may be found in the treatment 
of roadside gore areas where the rate of accidents is 
approximately four times as great as the rate of 
"ran-off-the-road" aocidents at other locations ( 1 ). 
There are two basic alternatives in providing adequate 
safety at off-ramp gores which are not located on 
structures. One is to keep the gore area and the area 
beyond free of all hazardous obstructions so as to 
provide a clear recovery area for out-of-control vehicles. 
This entails the exclusive use of break-away signs, light 
standards, etc., fn the gore area and often contour 
grading (Figure 12) to keep the gore as nearly level with 
the roadway as is practicable so that errant vehicles will 
not be upset or abruptly stopped by steep slopes. The 
second alternative is to protect erratic drivers and vehicle 
occupants from hazardous gores by means of an impact 
attenuating device. At the present time, there are three 
predominant types (illustrated in Figures 13-15) of 
impact attenuators available: I) Hi-Dro Cushions, 2) 
Fitch Barrels and 3) steel drums. Other than space 
available for the cushion, there are three factors that 
should be used in selecting an appropriate 
energymabsorbing device: installation, maintenance, and 
damage repair costs. Unfortunately at the present time, 
installation, maintenance, and damage repair data are 
insufficient to establish which of the above three (or 
more) systems is the most cost effective. Furthermore, 
accident data establishing the relative dynamic 
performance among impact attenuators is lacking ·-
necessitating the assumption that, for the present, all 
three systems are equal in performance. In summary, 
the choices for increased safety at hazardous gores (not 
on structure) are principally contour grading and 
installation of an energy-abosrbing barrier. 
The safety treatment of existing off-ramp gores on 
structures consists simply of the installation of an 
energy-absorbing barrier. For all new construction, the 
Federal Highway Administration (1 0) currently 
recommends that space be reserved, according to Figure 
16, for potential crash-cushion installations. A safer, but 
more radical, approach to this problem would be the 
elimination of off-ramp gores from structures. Though 
the feasibility of this approach is admittedly uuknown, 
it seems to be worthy of further investigation. 
In conclusion, the safety barrier dilemma is 
apparent. What is not apparent is how the highway 
designer is to select from the alternatives presented here. 
How is the designer to make a rational decision? How 
is he to choose one particular solution? The answer, 
though complex, seems to lie primarily in more daring 
design innovations which provide a better match 
between man and his behavioral patterns. 
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Figure 1. Steep Sideslope "Protected" with Gull!'drail 
Figure 2. Flat Sideslope without Guardrail. 
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Figure 3. Severity Comparison of Embankments vs. Guardrail ( 6) 
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Figure 4. Distribution of Off-the Road Incidents (7). 
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Figure 5. 30-Foot Clear Zone. 
Figure 6. Median Bridge l'iors "l'rotected" with Guardrail. 
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Figure 7. Median Bridge Piers "Protected" with Earth llenn. 
7 
00 
n.r .x.s·-o· !50'·.,. A..~ E-d~ --
E&m '-"' 
-~~~- -~--
~ 
0 -· or~~~~ 
~~~;fl~- ~~~ 
0 -------
of~/'!""0~ 
rtQ:id'Q!r 
l 
"' -------~ 
'1"-
-~~~-
PLAN SCAL~ ""' 
-NOTE-S-
ME-T>rOQ Qo M~f~~~ OFRA"""'"'r 
~ eu .. ~Hon "!Y?'l2W"'="'""'"'"' 
P/4n 
z~~fk~t/t :t·:/-if,.:73r:lt'fff~ ~",:'lt,:"'!hZ r:;;,D:;i: /t;t;J"f:fic~~;;:::ittM 
Jjlh ~tif,_-e~fc""J;~";f.,~o;',;;'1r] :Jc~~r~w %;<:-N"'t~ rca,:;;:;t:'l~ ~e t;1.e 
bef:%' the finu'J;;!;J %mpl.;;k, .find p.,/d Jbr "'' /A: tbJ:trdfc'i"!md pric~ per cvbk~ 
~e&;:::'f{:ff§"J/J pg/.s;~k"7!%"f~"/r~~f,$'JiJ/:%J~'1). .. o/e!/'g,~~/£~ me&.n1 
5fl"ttefure hc,~liqn 
I I~-
A--t._..,M~ PkrofSi~  
/1' 
( \ ) Cilnhr ll1 Cenkr~ 
.,.,.. I ~-~~ fm'oW!t:nt:rP~~~ 
I I I 
__ ,. •-r 
r.;;; $'.it7 t%1,.fJXir'M.,fPorl~J;'flf:J,f'lc{g; .sg;q~r;,,;;'fl,':~St!l'f.j'/'ffi. 
" 
SCAL!:"" 7uf. 
:;~-~'----" 
SeCTION A·A 
(b) Wh"" .soft¢~ i.s nof ~<><m7'iJ,'1j f'/,!f!;:;';f for.sfrvcfure e><c.;,.Chn ofiNp.V 
~§ .. ~;;:9 ,Jr/"f)/'{:.';,;Jfl,j'lf,: {ji,,.= ow "'re gr .. &i-19 !me indlc,;>kd by ~)or 
Pufrm;~l~d Pio~ 
(JJ 7ht: ccnfr~rumte:;C_c ~rlin. Ft ,,;,. ~r4'kd ,;md t;"""lf(''J:i non.,- k4 
-'j;'[/£{fj;ff ~;;;7//j&.,,~ ~~~m.>; b=kfl!! ,.,.,lcrio!!.;;n of r inCJdm 
(b) l:-t_C.H-Mfion forl-h'i ee!'I0!'4kd piP<omd n_Ot!·peJ:forPfed f'IJ:;_ sh.;>/1 be /[/id /or.-1 
J~r,J:~s-~~f?(,;;,'}':J,tg.t~l forti? m&:clian 105 o ., S/.m</4 
SlOPe Pro!r:cfion 
(!#}~'f-:~'r,g'l~e s;ztt'?"'fe#~t% frtf1,~~'1/,//ke..~~:t':7t%hJfirpv 
1 ..t:Jr,btjg4 ~'/:d'ln~~f!.Zllkt:;;:/y91;/t,t;,ji%7?/A~ f/.,'?fr:.S· b.tcl: ,,~_~t 
~~~~~~~~- Go' se.,~in .tnd Prol~c!ion 
7h~ ,>Uf'l,;cr: ,.,...,;, of !he ~.-rlh bfll:. oulsid,/he 1/mifs of lh~ sk>P.: ~/},p/f 
SE;CTION !I·B 
Figure 8. 
';~ff.%.1Ht:*::Ht=:,#..,(tilf'::'!co';,Z/,'d: ::flt:rt;gp~ ... "" tr~tt •nd 
MArtcRIA.L /2£-Qlllli'£-Ml:NfS 
.Slop~ Profr;!!t/on 
:J~gn'f!::"f.fff f.'lj;;Jif~ 'g;e~ft,C/.f/ffff,.,"f:fc~"lP~i/Jfca'r!o"/ff,";~')/M! c"J:fii/,_ln 
CONSTRUCTION RJ:;G.UIIi'f:t.ll!NTS 
~"f'""i'--~---,cc''\-_;:Confovrs j,hown;re.;t fif'lfet'Yi'l.s, "ba>'e dil:::h eleY,;>Iion. In the narmo>l ~c.h'an ollho 
- }s"'d~tf.,'fr:?tour.< sMII be p.m;l/e/ fa fhe ptom gr.,;~de. Tht:n=t: sh.;/lbo ro~.~ndM 
Pc-"""lt:d Pipt: ::;,rgrc;;:t.,f'f',g.ft:".:f-, bt;,';'t{:/!;t:/t!J';/ed :r;J";.~;Z;j ~; .. ~~,;r/;~~~TrZ'Ped:t.% 
~~g,.",-?gj~~'fj;j',;:JJ:~:Fg/,;J"d.>l! opt:r.,;~s t'fi.;t r~qwrr: lr.,;>'l!lo,..4r !h., prcp,.red 
$J'jfl% ?,'i"/~.f'JJ:a*~':ftg,'f'J,frgj1ff,. 'Ji/;:;,.:; .,.-;;.q:ifdJ'/J~ fh-. bridge ...,(1/h .m:l to"' 
COMMONWEALTH Of K!::NTUCKY 
DeflAro'"MHIT Of- HIGHWAYS 
eARTH B&RM 
AT ME':OI"N PI&RS 
(GO' MEDIAN WlDTH) 
&dfillwilh N,;lur.>l s;rn~ l<l:ht:n !h., &rlh7kn>r=lrids !he norm.>! flaw->! !""'lt:rlfl lhcmm,.-n, the WJICJ"" shP!bc STANDARD DRAWING NO 
~a"f:r>.'"g'l%/"l:f:;fj/;:;:.,rd · '//C'tJf,<;j:;"}.d~:m".:9f':::"r%'::a~~.,~~W;(;:;;;Q,fJZ;'~"':J,/J;;},':'"'·• ' 
.5):>=1'"~. 010-TAIL "A" "- ""'T~ ~'G.""""V~NG<HU"- I)O;t~ 
Earth Berm Design with Warped Nose and Variable Sideslopes. 
40 
• 
Figure 9. Narrow Median Requiring a limier. 
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Median limier requirements ( 5 ). 
9 
Figure H, Wide 60"Foot Median, 
Figure 12, Elimination of Hazardous Gores by Contour Grading, 
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Figure 13. Hi-Dro Cushion Type Impact Attenuator. 
Figure 14. Fitch Type Impact Attenuator. 
II 
Figure 15. Steel Drum Type Impact Attenuator. 
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Dimensions for Crash Cushion Reserve Area on New Construction (feet) 
Design ~peed 
Minimumt on 
Mainline 
(m,p.h;) Re1>tricted Conditions Unrestricted Conditions Preferred' 
N L F N L F N L F 
30 6 8 2 8 11 3 12 17 4 
50 6 17 2 8 25 3 12 33 4 
70 6 28 2 8 45 3 12 55 4 
80 6 35 2 8 55 3 12 70 4 
NOTES: 
tMinimum 
Restricted Conditions -These dimensions approximately describe the space required for 
installation of the current generation of crash cushion devices without encroachment on 
shoulders and with the nose of the device offset slightly back of the parapet or ·shoulder line 
However, there are designs already developed that would not fit in the space provided by 
these dimensions. These dimensions are absolute minimums and should only be considered 
where there are extremely tight geometric controls or where project plan development at the 
time of the issuance of this memorandum is so far advanced that revising plans to get greater 
space would be extremely disruptive to the highway program. 
Unrestricted Conditions - These dimensions should be considered as the minimum for all 
projects where plan development is not far advanced except for those site:? where it can be 
shown that the increased cost for accommodating these dimensions, as opposed to those., for 
Restricted Conditions, will be unreasonable. 
(For example, if t\"l.e use of the greater dimensions would require the demolishing of an 
expensive building or a considerable increase in construction costs then the lesser dimen-
sions might be considered,) 
tPreferred 
These dimensions, which are considerably greater than required for the present generation 
of Crash cushion devices, should also be considered optimum. There is no intention to imply 
that·if space is provided in accordance with these dimensions that the space will be fully 
occupied by a crash cushion device. The reason for proposing these dimensions is so that 
if experience shows that devices should be designed for greater ranges of vehicle weights 
and/or for lower deceleration forces there will be space available for installation of such 
devices in the future. In the meantime, the unoccupied reserve crash cushion space will 
provide valuable additional recovery area. 
Figure 16. Reserve Area for Off-Ramp Gores ( 5 ). 
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